The elusive standard of artificial intelligence. Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence. Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 9: 425-445. Other bodies, other minds: a machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem. Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial Intelligence, 1: 5-25. On naturalising reference, with some considerations on the simulative method in cognitive science. Subcognition and the limits of the Turing Test. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 63-73.
Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology. Philosophical and methodological issues in the quest for the thinking computer.
Steps toward the synthetic method: symbolic information processing and self-organizing systems in early artificial intelligence. The discovery of the artificial: behavior, mind and machines before and beyond cybernetics. In: Lycan W.G., ed., Mind and cognition: an anthology, 2nd Edition. Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. A neurocomputational perspective: the nature of mind and the structure of science. Neurophilosophy: toward a unified science of the mind/brain.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Ĭopeland B.J. New horizons in the study of language and mind. Hove (East Sussex, UK): The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour: 49-53. Revisiting Turing and his test: comprehensiveness, qualia, and the real world. Jazz and machine consciousness: towards a new Turing test. In: Osherson D., Gleitman L., Kosslyn S., Smith E. Keywords: Interface problem, Naturalization of cognition, Naturalization of reference, Philosophy of cognitive science, Simulations in cognitive science, Turing test Tuttavia, la costruzione di modelli simulative di (parti di) un sistema cognitivo sotto la forma di artefatti e la verifica delle loro prestazioni attraverso una forma di test di Turing, potrebbe, almeno in linea di principio, consentirci di "reimmergere" le spiegazioni naturalistiche della cognizione nel mondo della nostra esperienza ordinaria, al fine di verificarne la corrispondenza con le nozioni del discorso mentale quotidiano e con le intuizioni del senso comune. E’ probabile infatti che, nello sviluppo di una visione scientifica, naturalistica dell’uomo, saremo costretti ad abbandonare molte nozioni psicologiche ordinarie, che potrebbero risultare inadeguate rispetto agli scopi e ai metodi dell’indagine naturalistica. Il problema dell’interfaccia (interface problem) consiste nel rendere conto delle relazioni che sussistono tra le nozioni psicologiche del discorso quotidiano e i resoconti scientifici del mentale.
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